Standby Letter of Credit - True Letters of Credit or Guaranties: Republic National Bank v. Northwest National Bank by Forgerson, Tim A.
SMU Law Review
Volume 33 | Issue 5 Article 9
1979
Standby Letter of Credit - True Letters of Credit or
Guaranties: Republic National Bank v. Northwest
National Bank
Tim A. Forgerson
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr
This Case Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in SMU Law Review
by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Tim A. Forgerson, Standby Letter of Credit - True Letters of Credit or Guaranties: Republic National Bank v. Northwest National Bank, 33




In Barker v. A/ied Supermarket the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that
a contract for sale giving rise to an implied warranty of merchantability is
created when, before payment, a consumer in a self-service store takes
physical possession of goods by removing them from the store shelf. The
court reasoned that the merchandise on the store shelf represents an offer
to the consumer to enter into a contract; the consumer can accept that offer
by promising to pay for the goods as evidenced by the act of taking physi-
cal possession of them by removing them from the shelf. Moreover, the
buyer's option to return unwanted merchandise does not affect this con-
tract formation. In so holding, however, the court ignored the doctrine of
mutuality of obligation. The court should have recognized that the con-
sumer's right to return a product prior to paying for it renders unenforce-
able any implied agreement to purchase between the shopper and the
retailer. While the UCC does provide a more flexible approach to con-
tracting than traditional approaches, the court in essence found a contract
when none existed.
Theodore W Daniel
Standby Letters of Credit-True Letters of Credit or
Guaranties: Republic National Bank v. Northwest
National Bank
Republic National Bank acted as successor trustee of a cemetery's per-
petual care fund.' The perpetual care fund contained, as one of its princi-
pal assets, a $50,000 promissory note made payable to the fund's trustee in
five equal payments by B&H Amusement Rides, Inc. (B&H). During ne-
gotiations for the sale of stock of the corporation that owned the cemetery,
the prospective purchaser refused to close the sale so long as the note re-
mained a fund asset. Consequently, B&H caused Northwest National
Bank to issue, in favor of the trustee, an Irrevocable Letter of Credit2 to
1. A perpetual care fund is a reserve, held in trust, with the income to maintain the
cemetery's grounds and physical plant. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 912a-2
(Vernon 1964).
2. The instrument was a standby letter of credit and read, in part, as follows:
2. Drafts. Your single draft drawn on Northwest National Bank of Fort
Worth, at ten (10) days' sight, in the amount of the unpaid principal, interest
and attorneys' fees then due and payable after default, pursuant to the terms
of a certain Promissory Note executed January 12, 1968, by B&H Amusement
Rides, Inc., payable to the order of American Cities Trust Company, which
draft must state upon its face: "Drawn under Letter of Credit of the North-
west National Bank of Fort Worth, Texas, dated February 21, 1969."
4. Purpose. To be applied to the balance remaining on a certain loan evi-
denced by a certain Promissory Note executed January 12, 1968, by B&H
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guarantee payment of the promissory note in the event that B&H de-
faulted.3 In the event of default, the letter of credit required the trustee to
present specified documents to Northwest, and, upon presentation, re-
quired Northwest to pay the principal, interest, and attorneys' fees due on
the note.4 B&H defaulted and Republic, as successor trustee, submitted to
Northwest the required documents and a draft for $45,104.75. Although
the documents complied fully with the instrument's terms, Northwest re-
fused to honor the draft, contending that the instrument constituted an
ultra vires5 guaranty agreement and therefore was unenforceable against a
national bank. Republic asserted that the instrument was an intra vires6
letter of credit and therefore was valid.7 Republic sued Northwest on the
Amusement Rides, Inc., payable to the order of American Cities Trust Com-
pany, secured by a security interest in and upon the inventory of B&H Amuse-
ment Rides, Inc.
5. DOCUMENTS. The required documents are:
(a) Original Promissory Note, executed January 12, 1968, by B&H
Amusement Rides, Inc., payable to the order of American Cities Trust Com-
pany.
(b) Copy of letter advising B&H Amusement Rides, Inc. of default in
the payment of the said note executed January 12, 1968, said advice letter
being addressed to B&H Amusement Rides, Inc., showing receipt and being
dated not less than twenty (20) days in advance of the date of Sight Draft.
(c) Copy of letter advising E.L. Baker, Jr., Jerome I. Weiner, and Henry
W. Simon, Jr. of default in the payment of the said Note executed January 12,
1968, said advice letter being addressed in care of Simon & Simon, attorneys,
816 First National Building, Fort Worth, Texas, and being dated not less than
twenty (20) days in advance of the date of Sight Draft.
(d) Copy of letter which advised owners of B&H Amusement Rides,
Inc. property of default in payment and resulting acceleration of the said
Promissory Note dated January 12, 1968, said letter being dated not less than
twenty (20) days prior to the date of Sight Draft.
6. OBLIGATION OF ISSUER. The Northwest National Bank of Fort
Worth, Texas, agrees with American Cities Trust Company, and/or its succes-
sor as Trustee of the Perpetual Care Fund of Crown Hill Memorial Park, a
Perpetual Care Cemetery, to duly honor a proper draft drawn and negotiated
in compliance with the terms of this Letter of Credit upon presentation to the
office of the bank.
Reprinted at Republic Nat'l Bank v. Northwest Nat'l Bank, 578 S.W.2d 109, Ill (Tex. 1978)
[hereinafter cited as the Instrument].
3. Instrument, supra note 2, para. 3.
4. Id, paras. 2, 5.
5. A literal translation of the term is beyond, outside of, or in excess of powers granted
or limited. Black's Law Dictionary defines the term as, "The modem technical designation
in the law of corporations, of acts beyond the scope of the powers of a corporation, as de-
fined by its charter or act of incorporation." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1692, 1742 (rev. 4th
ed. 1976). See also 4 THE MICHIE Co., MICHIE ON BANKS AND BANKING ch. 7, § 33, at 48
nn.40-44 (rev. perm. ed. 1971) (ultra vires contract of bank is beyond its powers and void)
[hereinafter cited as MICHIE].
6. "An act is said to be intra ires ('within the power') of a person or corporation when
it is within the scope of his or its powers or authority." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 958 (rev.
4th ed. 1976).
7. Traditionally, national banks have been viewed as not having authority to act as a
guarantor or surety for the performance of contracts made by others. See Border Nat'l Bank
v. American Nat'l Bank, 282 F. 73, 77-78 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 260 U.S. 701 (1922);
Harfield, The National Bank Act and Foreign Trade Practice, 61 HARV. L. REV. 782, 788
(1948); Comment, Recent Extensions in the Use of Commercial Letters of Credit, 66 YALE
L.J. 902, 913-14 (1957).
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instrument, and the trial court held that the instrument constituted an ultra
vires guaranty agreement. The court of appeals affirmed,8 and Republic
appealed to the Texas Supreme Court. Held, reversed: An instrument is a
letter of credit if the issuer has a primary obligation that is dependent
solely upon the presentation of conforming documents and not upon the
factual determination of performance or nonperformance by the parties to
the underlying transaction. Republic National Bank v. Northwest National
Bank, 578 S.W.2d 109 (Tex. 1978).
1. LETTERS OF CREDIT, GUARANTIES, AND STANDBY LETTERS OF
CREDIT
A. Letters of Credit
A letter of credit is an instrument executed by a bank or other issuer' in
which the issuer promises to honor drafts or other demands for payment if
the person drawing the drafts, the beneficiary, complies with the condi-
tions specified in the instrument.'" Traditionally, letters of credit arise in
the context of a contract for the sale of goods between a seller and a for-
eign buyer," primarily to assure the seller of prompt payment against doc-
uments. 12 As a result, the credit of a financially solvent bank is added to
8. Republic Nat'l Bank v. Northwest Nat'l Bank, 566 S.W.2d 358 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Fort Worth 1978).
9. An issuer is defined as a bank or other person issuing a credit. TEX. Bus. & COM.
CODE ANN. § 5.103(a)(3) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968). Section 24 of the National Bank Act,
12 U.S.C. § 24 (1976), sets forth limitations on the powers of national banks. To date, courts
have upheld the power of national banks to issue letters of credit. See Border Nat'l Bank v.
American Nat'l Bank, 282 F. 73, 77-78 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 260 U.S. 701 (1922); Pruden-
tial Ins. Co. of America v. Marquette Nat'i Bank, 419 F. Supp. 734, 735 (D. Minn. 1976).
See generally Harfield, supra note 7, at 795-97. In addition, the Comptroller of the Currency
(Department of the Treasury) has concluded that "[a] national bank may issue letters of
credit permissible under the Uniform Commercial Code or the Uniform Customs and Prac-
tice for Documentary Credits to or on behalf of its customers." 12 C.F.R. § 7.7016 (1979).
10. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 5.103(a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
11. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 18-1, at 601 (1972). For example, a Danish furniture seller may insist
that a New Jersey buyer procure a letter of credit issued by a bank showing seller as "benefi-
ciary" with authority to draw drafts on the issuing bank. Should buyer agree to this mode of
payment he applies to his own bank to issue an irrevocable letter of credit that commits his
bank (issuer) to pay a draft drawn by seller upon seller's proper presentment of the draft and
any required documents. Seller then ships the goods and airmails the documents to the
issuing bank to receive payment before the delivery of the goods. Id at 604. Letters of
credit have been used for centuries in international trade. W. WARD & H. HARFIELD, BANK
CREDITS AND ACCEPTANCES 145 (4th ed. 1958); Harfield, supra note 7, at 790-92; Verkuil,
Bank Solvency and Guarany Letters of Credit, 25 STAN. L. REV. 716, 716 n.I (1973).
12. See Venizelos, S.A. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 425 F.2d 461, 464 (2d Cir. 1970). In
an ordinary letter of credit transaction, when the seller ships the goods to the buyer, the
seller usually obtains a bill of lading from the transporter of the goods. A bill of lading is a
statement by the transporter that the goods are in his possession and that he is forwarding
them to the buyer. The seller then submits to the bank his statement that he has supplied the
goods contracted for (a commercial invoice), the bill of lading, and any insurance policy
covering the goods. The bank will pay upon this presentation of documents to the bank.
The letter of credit does not always require these documents, but may require any docu-
ments upon which the parties agree. H. HARFIELD, BANK CREDITS AND ACCEPTANCES 56-
69 (5th ed. 1974). See Anglo-South American Trust Co. v. Uhe, 261 N.Y. 150, 184 N.E. 741,
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the uncertain solvency of a foreign buyer, assuring payment regardless of
whether the buyer is unable or refuses to pay.13
Letters of credit ordinarily arise as the third in a series of three contracts:
an initial contract for the sale of goods to the bank's customer by the bene-
ficiary, a second contract between the bank and the bank's customer in
which the bank agrees to issue the letter of credit, and a third contract
between the bank and the beneficiary, the letter of credit. 14 This series of
contracts therefore establishes the letter of credit as a separate contract that
contains the sole agreement between the issuer and the beneficiary.'
5
To comply with safe banking practices, a letter of credit usually (1) con-
tains a conspicuous statement designating the letter of credit as such; (2)
specifies an expiration date or states a definite term; (3) limits the amount
of the credit; and (4) obligates the bank to make payment only upon the
presentation of a draft or other documents.' 6 The bank also should obli-
gate unconditionally the bank's customer to reimburse the issuer for any
payments made under the letter of credit.' 7 The letter of credit, however,
743 (1933). The letter of credit may also be a "clean" credit in which no documents are
required and only the beneficiary's draft or demand for payment is required for payment.
Note, Guaranty Letters of Credit. Problems and Possibilities, 16 ARIz. L. REV. 822, 824
(1974).
13. Murray, Letters of Credit in Nonsale of Goods Transaction, 30 Bus. LAW. 1103, 1103
(1974). When selling goods in a foreign jurisdiction the seller faces these common risks: (I)
buyer's insolvency or other inability to pay; (2) buyer's wrongful refusal to pay against
documents or upon delivery; and (3) buyer's refusal to pay because one of the seller's prior
shipments is nonconforming or, upon inspection, the present shipment of goods is noncon-
forming. The letter of credit reduces these risks by making payment due upon presentation
of documents to a bank. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note i, § 18-1, at 603.
14. Venizelos, S.A. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 425 F.2d 461, 464-65 (2d Cir. 1970); see
Justice, Letters of Credit. Expectations and Frustration-Part 1, 94 BANKING L.J. 424, 425
(1977). But see J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 11, § 18-2. White and Summers argue
that the letter of credit is not a contract and thus the issuer's obligation to honor drafts
drawn by the beneficiary is not contractual. They note that the beneficiary does not enter
into any agreement with the issuer; and, in fact, the issuer and the beneficiary may be wholly
unknown to each other at the time the letter of credit is issued. White and Summers also
argue that the letter of credit is not a third-party beneficiary contract because the claim of
the beneficiary is not subject to the same defenses (e.g., failure of condition and anticipatory
breach) that a true third-party beneficiary's claim is generally subject to. Id
15. Venizelos, S.A. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 425 F.2d 461, 465 (2d Cir. 1970); King-
dom of Sweden v. New York Trust Co., 197 Misc. 431, 96 N.Y.S.2d 779 (Sup. Ct. 1949);
Comment, Commercial Letters of Credit: Development and Expanded Use in Modern Com-
mercial Transactions, 4 CUMBERLAND-SAMFORD L. REV. 134, 142 n.9 (1973). See also R.
BRAUCHER & R. RIEGERT, INTRODUCTION TO COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS 360 (1970).
16. 12 C.F.R. § 7.7016 (1979). The bank must not be called upon to determine ques-
tions of fact or law at issue between the bank's customer and the beneficiary. Id See also
note 20 infra and accompanying text.
17. 12 C.F.R. § 7.7016 (1979). The Comptroller of the Currency has concluded that
these factors need not be present for a national bank to honor a letter of credit. The guide-
lines are offered as a means of encouraging safe and sound banking practices. The Comp-
troller has also concluded that the legality of a letter of credit is governed solely by state
statutory law, such as the Uniform Commercial Code as adopted by a state, or by conven-
tion, such as the Uniform Customs and Practices For Documentary Credits. See 42 Fed.
Reg. 24,206 (1977) (interpretive ruling by Comptroller of the Currency). The UCC requires
that: (1) the receipt must include a promise by the issuer to honor drafts or other demands
for payment upon compliance with the conditions specified in the credit; (2) if the credit is
issued by a bank and does not require a documentary draft or documentary demand for
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need not be in any particular form.' 8
Since the letter of credit is a contract separate from the underlying con-
tract between the beneficiary and the bank's customer, the bank has a pri-
mary obligation to the beneficiary.' 9 The bank does not determine the
validity of the underlying contract or whether the contract is faithfully per-
formed, but instead must examine the documents presented to it to deter-
mine whether the documents on their face comply with the terms of the
letter of credit.2" The bank must act in good faith in determining the va-
lidity of the documents and then must make payment according to its de-
termination of the documents' validity.2' Should the beneficiary fail to
perform the underlying contract, the bank's customer has an action against
the beneficiary on the underlying contract or under section 5-111 (1) of the
Uniform Commercial Code.22 The bank's customer has no action against
the bank unless the bank accepts noncomplying documents in bad faith
and honors the draft.23 If the specified documents comply with the terms
of the letter of credit, the bank must honor the demand for payment even
payment or, although requiring neither of these, is issued by a person other than a bank and
does not require that the draft or demand be accompanied by a document of title, then the
letter must state conspicuously that it is a letter of credit; (3) the letter must be in writing;
and (4) the letter must be signed by the issuer. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 5.102(a),
.103(a)(I), .104(a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968); J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 11, § 18-
4, at 615.
18. Border Nat'l Bank v. American Nat'l Bank, 282 F. 73, 79 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 260
U.S. 701 (1922).
19. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 5.114(1), Comment I (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968);
see Barclay's Bank D.C.O. v. Mercantile Nat'l Bank, 481 F.2d 1224, 1236 (5th Cir. 1973),
cert. dismissed, 414 U.S. 1139 (1974); Asociacion de Azucareros de Guatemala v. United
States Nat'l Bank, 423 F.2d 638, 641 (9th Cir. 1970).
20. Asociacion de Azucareros de Guatemala v. United States Nat'l Bank, 423 F.2d 638,
641 (9th Cir. 1970); see Banco Espanol de Credito v. State St. Bank & Trust Co., 385 F.2d
230, 234 (1st Cir. 1967), cerl. denied, 390 U.S. 1013 (1968); Dynamics Corp. v. Citizens & S.
Nat'l Bank, 356 F. Supp. 991, 995-96 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
21. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 5.114, Comment I (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
22. Id., Comment 2. See also Bossier Bank & Trust Co. v. Union Planters Nat'l Bank,
550 F.2d 1077 (6th Cir. 1977).
23. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 5.114(b) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968) states:
Unless otherwise agreed when documents appear on their face to comply with
the terms of a credit but a required document does not in fact conform to the
warranties made on negotiation or transfer of a document of title (Section
7.507) or of a security (Section 8.306) or is forged or fraudulent or there is
fraud in the transaction
(1) the issuer must honor the draft or demand for payment if honor is
demanded by a negotiating bank or other holder of the draft or demand
which has taken the draft or demand under the credit and under circum-
stances which would make it a holder in due course (Section 3.302) and in
an appropriate case would make it a person to whom a document of title
has been duly negotiated (Section 7.502) or a bona fide purchaser of a secur-
ity (Section 8.302); and
(2) in all other cases as against its customer, an issuer acting in good faith
may honor the draft or demand for payment despite notification from the
customer of fraud, forgery or other defect not apparent on the face of the
documents but a court of appropriate jurisdiction may enjoin such honor.
By implication, the issuer may refuse to honor a draft if (1) the required documents do not
conform to warranties made on negotiation or transfer of a document of title or of a security,
(2) the required document is forged or fraudulent, or (3) there is fraud in the transaction,
provided that the party demanding payment is not a holder in due course or a person to
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if the bank's customer directs the bank not to honor the draft.24 Generally,
the bank may dishonor the demand only when the documents fail to com-
ply with the terms of the letter or when the documents are fraudulently
presented.25
B. Guaranties
A guaranty is a contractual undertaking by one person, the guarantor, to
answer for payment of a debt or performance of a contract or duty in case
of the default of another person, the principal, who is liable for such pay-
ment or performance in the first instance. 26 The principal undertakes a
primary, unconditional promise to a third party, the creditor or guaran-
tee. 27 The guarantor then undertakes a secondary promise to the guaran-
tee, expressly conditional upon the principal's nonperformance of his
primary duty to the guarantee. 28 As a general rule, the liability of the
guarantor is measured by the liability of the principal to the guarantee.29
Therefore, upon nonperformance by the principal, the guarantor may
avoid secondary liability under the guaranty contract if the principal is not
bound under the principal contract to perform.3" Where, under the condi-
tions of the contract between the principal and the guarantee, no liability
has arisen on the part of the principal, there is no liability on the part of
the guarantor. 31 Hence, where the principal's duty is conditioned upon an
whom a document of title has been duly negotiated, or a bona fide purchaser of a security.
J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 1I, § 18-6, at 624.
A forged document includes forged signatures, and a fraudulent document is one that is
specious or is materially altered. Fraud in the transaction means egregious fraud; misrepre-
sentation as to quality is insufficient. Id at 624-25.
24. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 11, § 18-6, at 620.
25. Id. at 620, 624.
26. See 38 AM. JUR. 2D Guaranty § 1, at 997 (1968); 38 C.J.S. Guaranty § 1, at 1130
(1943). Similar definitions abound. See, e.g., L. SIMPSON, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF
SURETYSHIP § 6, at 10 (1950) (guarantor is one who promises either that principal will per-
form his duty, or that, if principal fails to do so, the guarantor will); 38 AM. JUR. 2D Guar-
anty § 2, at 997 (1968) (guarantor is one who undertakes promise that is collateral to a
primary obligation on the part of the principal, which promise binds the guarantor to per-
formance in the event of nonperformance by the principal); accord, Clymer v. Terry, 109
S.W. 1129, 1131 (Tex. Civ. App. 1908, no writ).
27. See L. SIMPSON, supra note 26, § 6, at 10; 38 AM. JUR. 2D Guaranty § 1, at 997
(1968); 38 C.J.S. Guaranty § I, at 1130 (1943). In the law of contracts, of which the guaranty
is a part, guarantee may also be referred to as the obligee. 38 AM. JUR. 2D Guaranty § 1, at
995-97 (1968).
28. L. SIMPSON, supra note 26, § 6, at 10-11 (1950). The debtor is not a party to the
guarantee, and the guarantor is not a party to the underlying principal obligation. Id
29. See 38 AM. JUR. 2D Guaranty § 51, at 1054-55 (1968); 38 C.J.S. Guaranty § 43, at
1192 (1943). The guarantor may, however, expressly assume a greater or lesser liability by
the terms of the guaranty contract with the guarantee. 38 C.J.S. Guaranty § 43, at 1192
(1943).
30. 38 AM. JUR. 2D Guaranty § 51, at 1054 (1968). Where the principal obligation is not
void (such as when there is no consideration or mutual assent or where the principal contract
is illegal or contrary to law), but merely unenforceable against the principal due to a defense
personal to the principal, the guaranty contract is enforceable. Id § 52, at 1056-57.
31. 38 C.J.S. Guaranty § 43, at 1192 (1943). See also L. SIMPSON, supra note 26, §§ 61,
62, at 292-94 (guarantee's nonperformance of conditions precedent and impossibility of per-
formance by principal).
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executory duty of performance on the part of the guarantee, the guaran-
tee's material failure of performance relieves the guarantor of liability on
the guaranty contract.
32
When the principal does not perform, the guarantor has two choices.3 3
He may determine that the underlying contract is void or unenforceable
against the principal, due to the guarantee's nonperformance or breach,
and refuse to honor the guaranty contract.34 Alternatively, he may decide
that the underlying contract is valid and enforceable against the principal
and honor the guaranty contract.35 If the guarantor chooses the latter
course, he may then proceed against the principal for reimbursement,
36
with the right to be subrogated to the position of the guarantee he pays.
3 7
Since the guarantor assumes only the rights of the guarantee to the princi-
pal contract and no more, 38 the principal may defeat the claim with any
valid defense he has against the guarantee. 39 In any event, the guarantor's
interpretation of the underlying contract may result in litigation.4"
As a general rule, national banks lack the statutory authorization to
guarantee the indebtedness of other parties.4 ' The prohibition stems from
the National Bank Act,42 which does not expressly authorize banks to act
as guarantors or sureties.43 National banks are limited to those functions
enumerated by the Act,' and consequently, national banks may not act as
32. L. SIMPSON, supra note 26, § 61, at 292. "When a creditor [guarantee] breaches his
contract with the principal and varies the sureties' [guarantors'] risk he discharges the sure-
ties [guarantors]." Seaboard Loan Corp. v. McCall, 61 Ga. App. 752, 7 S.E.2d 318, 319
(1940).
33. See generally W. WARD & H. HARFIELD, supra note 11, at 133-34.
34. Id. The guarantee may then bring an action against the guarantor on the guaranty
contract. As a practical matter, this is the safest avenue for the guarantor to take. If the
guarantor honors the guaranty contract absent the aid of a court decree, the likelihood of
failure in a subsequent suit for reimbursement against the principal is increased. See gener-
ally id.
35. Id
36. Id; L. SIMPSON, supra note 26, § 48, at 224.
37. L. SIMPSON, supra note 26, § 47, at 205; see W. WARD & H. HARFIELD, supra note
11, at 133-34.
38. L. SIMPSON, supra note 26, §§ 47, 48, at 205, 224; see W. WARD & H. HARFIELD,
supra note 11, at 133-34.
39. See W. WARD & H. HARFIELD, supra note 11, at 133-34.
40. Id
41. Eg., Farmers & Miner's Bank v. Bluefield Nat'l Bank, 11 F.2d 83, 85 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 271 U.S. 669 (1926); Bowen v. Needles Nat'l Bank, 94 F. 925, 927-28 (9th Cir. 1899),
cert. denied, 176 U.S. 682 (1900); National Surety Corp. v. Midland Bank & Trust Co., 408
F. Supp. 684, 692 (D.N.J. 1976). See Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Marquette Nat'l
Bank, 419 F. Supp. 734, 735 (D. Minn. 1976); American Empire Ins. Co. v. Hanover Nat'l
Bank, 409 F. Supp. 459, 463 (M.D. Pa. 1976). See generally 4 MICHIE, supra note 5, ch. 7,
§ 44, at 75-80; Harfield, supra note 7, at .788; Comment, supra note 7, at 911-12.
42. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1976). Section 24 of the Act sets forth the corporate powers of
national banks. Paragraph seven of that section empowers national banks and their agents
"[tlo exercise ... subject to law, all such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on
the business of banking." Id Immediately following this provision, however, is a list of
expressly enumerated powers of national banks. Id
43. Id
44. See, e.g., Colorado Nat'l Bank v. Bedford, 310 U.S. 41, 48-50(1940) (national banks
possess only the powers conferred by Congress); Yonkers v. Downey, 309 U.S. 590, 596
(1940) (national banks have no implied power to pledge assets as security for deposits);
1980] NOTES 1307
SOUTH WESTERN LAW JO URNAL
guarantors or sureties.45 The issuance of letters of credit, however, is a
valid power of national banks46 despite the absence of express authoriza-
tion in the National Bank Act. 7 One commentator criticizes the distinc-
tion as inconsistent in terms of statutory authority.48
C. Standby Letters of Credit
The letter of credit continues to be used in international sale-of-goods
transactions; however, letters of credit are being used in new, nontradi-
tional transactions as security devices in connection with transactions not
involving a sale of goods.49 In the three-contract transaction,5 ° the first
contract is a debt agreement between the bank's customer as obligor and
the beneficiary as obligee, rather than a sale-of-goods contract between the
bank's customer and the beneficiary. The standby letter of credit usually
obligates the bank to the beneficiary (1) for repayment of money borrowed
by, or advanced to, or for the account of, the bank's customer, or (2) for
payment on account of any indebtedness undertaken by the bank's cus-
tomer, or (3) for payment on account of any default by the bank's cus-
tomer in the performance of the obligation.5 As a result, the standby
Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Pottorff, 291 U.S. 245, 253-54 (1934) (national banks lack power to
pledge their assets to secure a private deposit). Thus, the powers specifically articulated in
§ 24 of the Act operate as a limitation on a national bank's corporate authority. The inci-
dental powers granted by the Act, see note 42 supra, work in the opposite direction.
The rule that banks' powers are limited to those prescribed by statute was first expressed
in Curtis v. Leavitt, 15 N.Y. 9, 52 (1857), the first case to interpret the New York Banking
Act of 1838. Despite the absence of express statutory authorization, however, the court up-
held the authority of a bank to borrow money, emphasizing that such authority was inciden-
tal and necessary to the exercise of expressly granted powers. Id at 52-53; see Harfield,
supra note 7, at 799, in which it is stated:
The doctrine of the Curtis case. . . is that when an organic statute refers to
a particular business, the history and current practices of that business furnish
the test of proper conduct, and a recital of techniques does not exclude the
employment of other techniques notwithstanding the maxim, expressio unius
est exclusio alterius.
(Footnote omitted.)
45. See note 41 supra and accompanying text. State banks have no greater powers of
guaranty than national banks. 4 MICHIE, supra note 5, ch. 7, § 44, at 80. The Texas Banking
Department Self-Support and Administration Act, which sets forth the function and powers
of state incorporated banks, is similar to the National Bank Act. Compare TEX. REV. CIV.
STAT. ANN. art. 342-301 (Vernon 1973) with 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1976). Texas courts adhere to
the rule that banks cannot act as guarantors. See Farmers' State Bank v. First State Bank,
260 S.W. 664 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1924, writ refd); First State Bank v. Sanford, 255
S.W. 644 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1923, no writ).
46. E.g., Border Nat'l Bank v. American Nat'l Bank, 282 F. 73, 77-78 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 260 U.S. 701 (1922); Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Marquette Nat'l Bank, 419 F.
Supp. 734, 735 (D. Minn. 1976); see note 9 supra.
47. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1976).
48. Harfield, supra note 7, at 788-90. Harfield does not dispute the distinction itself;
instead, he argues that the rationale for such a distinction is better found in an analysis of
sound banking practices and the history of the banking industry. Id.
49. See genera/y Murray, supra note 13, at 1103; Verkuil, supra note 11, at 717, 721;
Comment, supra note 7, at 902.
50. See notes 14-15 supra and accompanying text.
51. See Venizelos, S.A. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 425 F.2d 461, 464-65 (2d Cir. 1970);
R. BRAUCHER & R. RIEGERT, supra note 15, at 360. See also Bossier Bank & Trust Co. v.
Union Planters Nat'l Bank, 550 F.2d 1077 (6th Cir. 1977); Baker v. National Blvd. Bank, 399
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credit is in substance a guaranty, but in form a letter of credit.52
Although standby letters of credit take the same basic form as tradi-
tional letters of credit and must meet the same requirements under the
Uniform Commercial Code,53 important differences separate the two.
Since standby letters of credit are based upon debt obligations, which may
arise from an infinite variety of commercial transactions,54 the nature of
the documents that the beneficiary must present to the issuer to obtain
payment has been altered radically.55 In addition, standby letters of credit
create a contingency element not present in the traditional letter of credit
transaction. In the latter, the bank expects the beneficiary to draw upon
the credit when the goods are shipped to the bank's customer; in standby
letters of credit transactions, however, the bank expects the beneficiary to
draw upon the credit only if the bank's customer defaults on the debt obli-
gation. 6 Finally, the risks associated with the issuance of standby letters
of credit as opposed to traditional letters of credit are different. One com-
mentator argues that an issuer of a credit is less exposed to loss in the sale
of goods context because he receives documents of title to the goods as a
precondition to payment to the beneficiary.57 In the standby letter of
credit context, an issuer retains no such security interest and must proceed
against its customer who has already defaulted on the underlying obliga-
tion.58 Another commentator, however, rejects the proposition that the is-
suer of a traditional letter of credit retains any material security by virtue
of the documents of title.59 He argues that the issuer (usually a bank) sel-
F. Supp. 1021 (N.D. Ill. 1975). The standby letter of credit may also be used to guarantee
performance in a construction contract. The letter of credit would be payable against the
beneficiary-owner's affidavit evidencing the contractor's default. Note, supra note 12, at 826.
Letters of credit may also be used to support the issuance of commercial paper. The bank
adds its credit to that of the issuing corporation, making the commercial paper more market-
able. Harfield, The Increasing Domestic Use of the Letter of Credit, 4 U.C.C.L.J. 251, 253
(1972).
52. 12 C.F.R. § 7.1160(a) (1979).
53. See Bossier Bank & Trust Co. v. Union Planters Nat'l Bank, 550 F.2d 1077 (6th Cir.
1977); Barclays Bank D.C.O. v. Mercantile Nat'l Bank, 181 F.2d 1224 (5th Cir. 1973), cert.
dismissed, 414 U.S. 1139 (1974); 12 C.F.R. §§ 7.1160(a), 7.7016 (1979).
54. For a discussion of the validity of transactions in which a standby credit has been
utilized as a security device, see Murray, supra note 13, at 1104-05; Verkuil, supra note 11, at
717; Comment, supra note 7, at 903-09.
55. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 5.102, Comment I (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
See Verkuil, supra note 1I, at 718; Comment, supra note 7, at 910. Some examples of docu-
ments that may be required are written notice of a customer's default, a third party certifi-
cate of nonperformance, or an architect's certificate or other written notification of
completion of construction. Verkuil, supra note I1, at 718, 722, 723.
56. See Harfield, supra note 7, at 258-59; Verkuil, supra note 11, at 723.
57. Verkuil, supra note 11, at 721, 723, 727-28. Verkuil argues that the issuer retains a
security interest in the documents. In addition, if a bank is the issuer it may debit its cus-
tomer's account as a result of the security interest. Id at 721.
58. Id at 723. This analysis, however, ignores instances such as those in Republic Nat'l
Bank v. Northwest Nat' Bank, in which the issuer had a security interest in the assets of the
bank's customer. It also ignores that letters of credit may be "clean" credits, where the letter
of credit has a sale-of-goods contract underlying it but the bank has no security interest in
the goods since it receives no documents. See note 12 supra. The risks involved have been
altered by changes in banking regulations. See notes 85-92 supra and accompanying text.
59. Harfield, The Standby Letter of Credit Debate, 94 BANKING L.J. 298, 298-99 (1977).
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dom retains the documents in the usual transaction.6 ° In any event, both
commentators agree that the issuer of a standby credit is less likely to be
reimbursed for honoring the letter of credit than the issuer of a traditional
letter of credit because the fact that the bank must pay under the standby
credit suggests that the customer is not at that time able to meet his current
liabilities.6 '
II. REPUBLIC NATIONAL BANK V. NORTHWEST NATIONAL BANK
The Texas Supreme Court confronted the question of whether standby
letters of credit are to be considered letters of credit or guaranties. The
Irrevocable Letter of Credit issued by Northwest provided that, should
B&H default upon its promissory note to the cemetery's perpetual care
fund, the trustee could draw on the letter of credit from Northwest in the
amount of the unpaid principal and interest by presenting to Northwest
the original promissory note along with copies of letters to B&H and its
attorneys notifying them of default on the note.62 Republic contended that
the instrument was a valid letter of credit and argued that, as such, North-
west's duty to honor the draft arose upon the presentation of the docu-
ments. Northwest contended that the instrument in substance was a
guaranty because Northwest's liability arose only upon the default of B&H
and, like a guaranty, acted as a secondary source of payment. The court
noted that all letters of credit, even the traditional ones, appear to serve as
guaranties.63 In a traditional letter of credit, in which the underlying con-
tract is for the sale of goods, the bank guarantees payment once the goods
are shipped and the documents presented to the bank. Whether an instru-
ment is a true letter of credit or a guaranty, therefore, does not rest on the
credit's function. It follows that the type of underlying contract, whether a
sale-of-goods transaction or a debt obligation, is unimportant in determin-
ing whether an instrument is a true letter of credit.64
Rather than determining the validity of the standby letter of credit on an
analysis of the type of underlying contract, the court examined the nature
of the obligation the issuer had to the beneficiary and the context in which
that obligation arose. In traditional letters of credit, the issuer has a pri-
60. Id at 299.
61. Id; Verkuil, supra note 11, at 723-24. Harfield suggests "[ilt is entirely possible,
however, that a pure guaranty credit may be a sounder transaction than a classic eligible
credit, if the banker has taken the precaution of obtaining collateral for the customer's obli-
gation to reimburse him." Harfield, supra note 59, at 299-300.
62. See Instrument, supra note 2, paras. 2, 5.
63. 578 S.W.2d at 114. The court quoted Harfield, Code Treatment of Letters of Credi
48 CORNELL L.Q. 92 (1962), in which Harfield stated:
A letter of credit always serves as a guaranty. This does not mean that it is a
guaranty. A letter of credit is an identical twin to a guaranty, but the fact that
the two things look alike and may be used for the same purpose and are diffi-
cult to distinguish one from the other . . . does not mean that there are not
differences, which, however subtle, are of major importance.
Id at 93 (footnote omitted). See also J. Halls, The Uniform Commercial Code in Minnesota.-
Article 5-Letters of Credit, 50 MINN. L. REV. 453, 454 n.3 (1966).
64. 578 S.W.2d at 114.
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mary obligation to the beneficiary for payment under the letter of credit
since the credit stands as a contract separate from the other two contracts
in the three-contract transaction.65 In a traditional guaranty agreement,
the bank, as guarantor, is secondarily liable.66 The beneficiary (obligee),
therefore, must seek performance or damages from the principal before
seeking performance from the guarantor.
The court relied on Barclays Bank D. C 0. v. Mercantile National Bank6 7
in concluding that standby letters of credit are distinguishable from guar-
anties. In Barclays the Fifth Circuit emphasized comment 2 to section
5.107 of the UCC and stated that a confirming bank6" becomes directly
liable on the credit when it confirms.69 The Fifth Circuit concluded that
the type of underlying contract is unimportant to the validity of the letter
of credit and to the bank's liability in that the essential element of a letter
of credit is the issuer's direct liability."0 The court, quoting section 5-
107(2) of the UCC, stated that a confirming bank, by confirming the credit,
becomes directly liable on the credit as though it were the issuer.7, The
Texas Supreme Court, drawing support from the conclusion in Barclays
that a confirming bank becomes directly liable as though it issued the
credit,72 concluded that the issuer's liability is also direct.73
The supreme court expressed concern about how the issuer's obligation
arose. If Northwest's obligation to pay arose only upon the default of
B&H, Northwest would have to determine whether default had occurred.
This determination might require the bank to examine questions of fact or
law concerning the underlying contract, characteristics identical to those of
guaranty and unlike those of a true letter of credit.74 For this reason the
court held that an "engagement is a letter of credit [only] if the issuer has a
primary obligation that is dependent solely upon presentation of con-
forming documents and not upon the factual performance or nonperform-
65. See notes 14 & 15 supra and accompanying text.
66. See notes 28-31 supra and accompanying text.
67. 481 F.2d 1224 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. dismissed, 414 U.S. 1139 (1974). In Barclays
Allied Mortgage Co. issued a $400,000 letter of credit in favor of Barclays Bank. The credit
provided that Allied would pay any indebtedness upon proper documentation that Bay
Holding Co. had failed to pay Barclays on an underlying promissory note. Mercantile con-
firmed the note at Allied's request. Bay Holding Co. subsequently defaulted and upon pres-
entation of documents to Mercantile, Mercantile refused to honor the draft. The court held
that the type of underlying contract made no difference; Mercantile had confirmed the note
and was therefore directly liable. Id at 1236, 1239.
68. A "confirming bank" is defined as a bank that engages that it will honor a credit
already issued by another bank. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. art. 5 provides that the
confirming bank's obligation, to the extent of the confirmation, is that of an issuer, as is the
right of reimbursement. Id § 5.107(b). The most important feature of this statute is that a
beneficiary who receives a confirmed credit has the independent engagements of both the
issuer and the confirming bank. Id § 5.107, Comment 2.
69. 481 F.2d at 1226, 1236.
70. Id at 1238-39.
71. Id at 1236.
72. Id
73. 578 S.W.2d at 115.
74. See id.
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ance by the parties to the underlying transaction."75 Construing the
instrument under this test,76 the court determined that the purpose of the
instrument was to pay the principal, interest, and attorneys' fees pursuant
to the terms of the promissory note.77 The court recognized that the instru-
ment referred to the underlying transaction, but concluded that the instru-
ment did not require Northwest to go outside the presentation of the
properly drawn draft and the four specific documents to determine its lia-
bility.78 Upon presentation, Northwest's duty was to inspect the docu-
ments on their face and to pay if the documents were correct, even if
Northwest believed that no default had occurred.7 9
The court cautioned, however, that national banks are not without limit
to issue instruments under the guise of letters of credit,8" citing Wichita
Eagle & Beacon Publishing Co. v. Pacific National Bank.81 In Wichita Ea-
gle the Ninth Circuit ruled that when a bank is required to examine the
underlying contract before honoring its obligation to pay, the instrument
strays too far from the basic purpose of letters of credit: namely, to assure
prompt payment upon the presentation of conforming documents, without
protracted, expensive litigation. 82 The court recognized that by eliminat-
ing the need for the bank to police the underlying contract, expenses and
litigation are minimized.83 The Ninth Circuit noted that if the distinction
between liability upon presentation of documents and determination of the
performance of the contract is ignored, then the distinction between a let-
ter of credit and an ordinary guaranty is obliterated.84
75. 576 S.W.2d at 115 (emphasis in original).
76. The court observed that letters of credit are governed by the construction rules of
ordinary contracts. Id See Venizelos, S.A. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 425 F.2d 461, 465-66
(2d Cir. 1970). See generally 6 MICHIE, supra note 5, ch. 12, § 31. The court stated that in
Texas an instrument is generally construed most strictly against its author and in such a
manner as to reach a reasonable result consistent with the intent of the parties. 578 S.W.2d
at 115. If two constructions are possible, a construction making performance possible is
preferred to one making performance impossible. Id See Portland Gasoline Co. v. Supe-
rior Marketing Co., 150 Tex. 533, 535, 243 S.W.2d 823, 824 (1951); Monesson v. Champion
Int'l Corp., 546 S.W.2d 631, 637 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
77. 578 S.W.2d at 116. This determination was apparently in response to Northwest's
argument that para. 4 of the instrument essentially provided that the purpose of the credit
was to guarantee the note and to protect payment in the event B&H defaulted on the note.
Id at 112; see Instrument, supra note 2, para. 2.
78. 578 S.W.2d at 116.
79. See note 17 supra.
80. 578 S.W.2d at 115.
81. 493 F.2d 1285 (9th Cir. 1974). In Wichita Eagle the lessor and lessee agreed with
the sublessee that the sublessee would construct a building on the leased property. The
sublessee was to provide a letter of credit, surety bond, or other form of guaranty to guaran-
tee the construction of the building. At the sublessee's request, Pacific Bank issued a letter of
credit in favor of the lessor and lessee. The lessor and lessee demanded payment from Pa-
cific when the sublessee did not complete the building. The court refused to characterize the
instrument as a letter of credit because the instrument did not specify any particular docu-
ments that were required, nor did it indicate that payment was predicated on presentation of
documents. Id at 1286-87.
82. Id at 1286-87. In Wichita Eagle the court held that the instrument was an ordinary
guaranty. Id at 1286.
83. Id at 1286-87.
84. Id at 1286.
1312 [Vol. 33
The Texas Supreme Court also discussed several commentators' con-
cerns that recognizing standby letters of credit might jeopardize bank sol-
vency. One concern was that banks did not realize the kind or degree of
risk taken by accepting standby credits.85 If a bank believed that it would
not be required to pay and failed to assure itself of the possibility of re-
coupment from the bank's customer, the bank would be taking an insur-
ance risk rather than a normal banking risk. 6 Because a bank may have
assumed that the credit would never be drawn on, the bank would have
been willing to grant standby credits;87 when the credit was drawn on,
however, it was usually accompanied by the customer's insolvency.88
Also, letters of credit traditionally have been treated as contingent liabili-
ties and not listed on a bank's balance sheet, which bank regulators ex-
amine to determine a bank's solvency. 89 The court dismissed these
concerns, observing that current federal regulations regard standby letters
of credit as the functional equivalent of loans and make standby credits
subject to the bank's statutory lending limits.9" Regulations also require
banks to make a credit analysis of the bank's customer comparable to one
required for an ordinary loan.9' In the court's opinion, these regulations
adequately safeguard bank solvency.92 By holding in favor of Republic,
however, the Supreme Court of Texas tacitly has accepted standby letters
of credit as valid letters of credit.
III. CONCLUSION
In Republic National Bank v. Northwest National Bank the Texas
Supreme Court held that the instrument issued by Northwest qualified as
an enforceable and intra vires letter of credit. To reach this conclusion, the
court held that under article 5 of the Uniform Commercial Code as
adopted by Texas an instrument is a true letter of credit if the bank has a
primary obligation that is dependent solely upon presentation of con-
forming documents and not upon the determination of performance or
nonperformance by the parties to the underlying transaction. In so hold-
85. 578 S.W.2d at 114; see Verkuil, supra note 1i, at 727-29; Note, supra note 12, at 831-
33.
86. R. BRAUCHER & R. RIEGERT, supra note 15, at 375.
87. See note 61 supra and accompanying text.
88. Note, supra note 12, at 832.
89. Verkuil, supra note 1i, at 727.
90. 12 C.F.R. § 7.1160(b) (1978). The Federal Reserve Board and the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation have similar requirements. 12 C.F.R. § 208.8(d)(2) (1978) (Federal
Reserve Board); 12 C.F.R. § 337.2(b) (1978) (FDIC).
91. 12 C.F.R. § 208.8(d)(2)(ii) (1978).
92. 578 S.W.2d at 114. One commentator, however, argues that the regulations are in-
adequate as they should also require aggregation of lending limits by looking through to the
ultimate user of the credit. Katskee, The Standby Letter of Credit Debate-The Casefor
Congressional Resolution, 92 BANKING L.J. 697, 705 (1975). Senator Edward Brooke also
did not agree that the Comptroller's ruling was adequate to protect bank solvency. Senator
Brooke would have amended the National Bank Act to provide that a bank's liability on
standby letters of credit would be limited to its entire capital stock, plus 50% of its
unimpaired surplus. The legal limitation on loans to a single borrower of 10% of the bank's
capital and surplus would also be made applicable. Id at 712.
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ing, the court recognized that while standby credits may function as guar-
anties, they avoid the possibility of expensive, protracted litigation that
accompanies guaranties. The decision allows the flexibility envisioned by
the UCC drafters, while avoiding undue risk to the issuing bank. The
court will recognize an instrument as a valid letter of credit if it meets the
court's test, unless the court determines that the instrument is disguised as
a letter of credit in order to serve a purpose at variance with the basic
purpose of a letter of credit.
Tim A. Forgerson
